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BOOK REVIEW 
DAVID ANTHONY CIFRINO 
EXPORTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE PRESS-GOV-
ERNMENT CRUSADE OF 1945-1952. By MARGARET A. BLAN-
CHARD, Logman Inc. White Plains, N.Y. 1986. 
In the view of some historians the Second World War, unlike 
any other before, was a war to vindicate human rights.! Before the 
United States entered the war, President Roosevelt laid out Four 
Freedoms necessary for global peace: freedom of worship, freedom 
from want, freedom from fear, and freedom of press. Still, among 
the first acts of the administration upon American entry into the 
war was the establishment of the Office of War Information charged 
with disseminating propaganda overseas, and the Office of Censor-
ship which sought voluntary restrictions domestically.2 Roosevelt 
could not have been surprised that American press associations 
would attempt to hold him to his pledge of freedom of the press 
and set off on a determined crusade to guarantee freedom of press 
around the world. This campaign, which began even before the war 
ended, is thoughtfully and painstakingly detailed in a recent book 
by Margaret A. Blanchard entitled Exporting the First Amendment-
The Press-Government Crusade of 1945-1952. The book provides valu-
able context for continuing legal battles in international law regard-
ing an international right to communicate and continuing contro-
versy regarding the polemic castings of freedom of expression such 
has been waged by Third World nations in advocating a "New World 
Information Order." 
The free press crusade was seen by the American press as a 
crucial component in the effort to make the world "safe for de-
mocracy,"3 especially in the movement toward the formation of the 
United Nations. News associations were initially encouraged in their 
efforts, Blanchard writes, by the State Department. 
Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle had assured the 
Foreign Press Association in June of 1944 that "freedom of 
I See Humphrey, The International Law of Human Rights in the Middle Twentieth Century in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER 
ESSAYS 75 (1973). 
2 M. BLANCHARD, EXPORTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 17 (1986). 
'Id. at 4. 
143 
144 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:143 
information is a major necessity if world organization is to suc-
ceed. With freedom of information there is always a possibility 
of understanding between peoples. Without it the way is always 
open to build up misunderstandings, suspicion, fear, and finally, 
hatred."4 
The support of the government posed problems for the jour-
nalists. Although clearly it was not possible for the press to influence 
international treaties alone, the government had different goals in 
a world-wide free press and different notions of what such a concept 
would mean. Blanchard details government facilitation of an early 
trip by a delegation organized by the American Society of News-
papers. Before the end of the war, the committee of free-press 
crusaders traveled to world capitals "to discuss plans to establish 
international freedom of information. "5 The newspapers could only 
cringe at one letter of support from Secretary of the Navy James 
Forrestal: '''We are indebted to the free press of America for our 
citizens' understanding of the Navy, and the facilitating of your 
journey will be a small installment in repayment."'6 As to the sub-
stance of their crusade, Roosevelt early on parted company with 
the press associations as noted by Blanchard: "[T]he president, and 
later the State Department, refused to speak solely of international 
freedom of the press. Instead Roosevelt advocated freedom of in-
formation to achieve a stable world: people must have 'freedom of 
knowledge, freedom of information' from all sources.'" The cru-
sade was also tested on a question of its commitment to the noble 
purposes it espoused. Blanchard writes about the reaction in Europe 
to a free press journey organized by Associated Press leader Kent 
Cooper: 
The Economist of London, for instance, charged that Cooper's 
"ode to liberty" really meant the "huge financial resources of 
the American agencies might enable them to dominate the 
world." In fact, Cooper, "like most big business executives, ex-
periences a peculiar moral glow in finding that his idea of 
freedom coincides with his commercial advantage .... Democ-
racy does not mean making the whole world safe for the AP."8 
'1:he crusade, then, fought battles on three fronts. In the United 
Na,tions the free press campaign sought to establish legal doctrine 
4Id. at 22. 
5Id. at 2l. 
6Id. at 24. 
7Id.at17. 
8Id. at 23. 
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and treaty law which would articulate and promulgate free press 
principles based on the American First Amendment model. Over-
seas, in the international area the crusade attempted to overcome 
resistance to free press within the borders of both friendly countries 
and in the Soviet Union. And at home, the press crusade became 
involved in controversy with the administration - the press seeking 
international freedom of the press and the government working to 
establish an information system to succeed its wartime propaganda 
mill. 
In retrospect the crusade seems at best idealistic and at worst 
painfully naive. Flushed from victory at war, American news profes-
sionals pounded their chests with pride and declared the American 
system as the best hope for global peace. The way to prevent an-
other war, the journalists suggested, was to prevent the manipula-
tion of the media. Blanchard reports the effusive message three 
members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) 
took to foreign conferences: 
Had not the Fascist and Nazi forces in Italy and Germany seized 
and dominated the press and all communications facilities at 
the start, the growth of these poisonous dictatorships might well 
have been prevented and the indoctrination of national thought 
in the direction of hatred and mistrust have been impossible. 9 
Initially, Blanchard writes, journalists and diplomats were able 
to work together, particularly in the area of Soviet-American rela-
tions. In a 1947 meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the 
interests of the press and the State Department were joined. The 
United States was seeking to improve relations and agreed to hold 
the meeting in Moscow. One condition for agreeing to the location 
was the American insistence that the Kremlin allow a significant 
number of American correspondents to cover the events. Amaz-
ingly, the American Ambassador, Walter Bedell Smith, proposed 
reducing the official American delegation in order to obtain fifteen 
more press visas. The purpose, Blanchard relates, was to challenge 
Soviet determination to keep their society closed. Although Moscow 
lived up to its promise to allow American correspondents to report 
on the conference without censorship, other stories, "including one 
about department store prices went through regular Soviet censor-
ship."lo 
9 [d. at 24. 
10 [d. at 83. 
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The ultimate goal of the State Department was to avoid the 
perceived danger of the American people being misinformed about 
Soviet affairs by correspondents who were regularly censored. In 
considerable detail Blanchard relates the construction of Soviet pol-
icy which exerted an iron grip on the reporting capacity of foreign 
correspondents stationed in Russia. It became clear to the govern-
ment and the free press crusaders that America's war ally was to be 
no friend of freedom of the press in peacetime and the news as-
sociations turned to friendly countries and the United Nations in 
hopes of achieving a consensus outside the communist world. 
The effort within the United Nations began at the organiza-
tion's formation in San Francisco. For the crusade it was something 
of a coming out party. Blanchard writes that "American journalists 
planned to use the organizing session to showcase the way in which 
a free press operated, but some editors worried about the negative 
influence that press misbehavior could have on the image of the 
profession and on the free-press crusade."ll The worst fears of the 
free press advocates were realized, according to Blanchard, as cov-
erage of the conference took on a circus-like atmosphere. "Conse-
quently, relationships between press and government were on a 
fairly normal adversarial level. For the free-press crusade to suc-
ceed, however, closer cooperation was essential."12 
In the end, all that the freedom of expression champions won 
for their cause was "vague language in the United Nations Charter 
that called for the promotion of 'universal respect for, and observ-
ance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all."'13 Kent 
Cooper of the Associated Press was dismayed at the failure of the 
American delegation to advocate a freedom of expression clause in 
the Charter. In fact, the State Department argued against any such 
provision. Blanchard reveals a letter Cooper sent to President Tru-
man: 
Surely, the president must "recognize press freedom as the sine 
qua non of enduring peace." If Truman abandoned the free-
press crusade, the Associated Press executive warned, "we can-
not withhold from the public the fact that nothing is to come 
of the declarations of policy in the party platforms last year and 
the concurrent resolutions of Congress." In fact, Cooper pre-
dicted, "the greatest opportunity of all time will be missed." 
Thus, "the public should understand that although this country 
II ld. at 53. 
121d. at 55. 
131d. at 56. 
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is to furnish good will, money and patronage to the nations that 
tried to destroy us, there will be nothing imposed by us as 
through the medium of a required press freedom to insure 
peace." 14 
147 
Truman, Blanchard reports, was not amused. "The president 
advised the Associated Press that he was 'unduly agitated.' Truman 
believed that several approaches for securing peace were feasible, 
and he stressed that his main desire was to obtain 'a peace settlement 
that would work.' But the president strongly opposed 'cramming 
anything down the throat of an independent nation that will inter-
fere with that peace settlement."'15 
With that, it was clear the immediate post-war glow of coop-
eration was gone from the united government-press coalition and 
the crusade turned its attention to seeking influence within the 
United Nations. In a chapter entitled "The Crusade Reaches its 
Apex On the International Front,"16 Blanchard discusses in detail 
the campaign's most successful efforts at securing international COn-
ventions and treaties that would ensure the goal of international 
freedom of expression. The key battleground was the Subcommis-
sion on Freedom of Expression of the United Nations Human 
Rights Commission. Leadership of the crusade in this engagement 
fell upon Harvard law professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr. Precisely 
because he was not a journalist, Chafee was doomed to fall into 
disfavor with the professional newsmen. It SOOn became apparent, 
however, that the debate On international freedom of expression 
was to move into areas of COncern outside the perspective of the 
single-minded press advocates. The professionals, Blanchard re-
ports, "believed that removing 'all obstacles to the flow of infor-
mation and the independent publication of newspapers' was the 
only answer to all press-related problems."17 The intellectual posi-
tion "included a call for the creation of correspondents' organiza-
tions throughout the world armed 'with strict self-administered 
codes of ethics' to upgrade professional performance."18 The view 
of the State Department "stressed concern over the quality of in-
ternational communication and called for serious 'study of the 
means by which mass media may be of more positive and creative 
HId. at 57. 
15Id. 
16Id. at 155. 
17/d. at 157. 
IBId. 
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service to the cause of international understanding."'19 It was Cha-
fee's task to bring about a consensus American position among these 
disparate views. As Blanchard points out, agreement domestically 
was a different thing from international understanding. 
Even though two out of three of these stances seemed to ad-
vocate imposing certain responsibilities on journalists to ensure 
their positive contributions to international peace, all the views 
placed the United States at the liberal end of the spectrum 
concerning freedom of the press. The Russians, who supported 
strict injunctions on the press to enforce responsible journalism, 
were at the other extreme. Between the two superpowers were 
the other nations of the world, which regarded American cam-
paigns for freedom of information that ignored the problems 
of press abuses with great suspicion. The smaller nations also 
feared that the American definition of freedom of the press 
meant "freedom for the invasion of powerful wire services, 
freedom for the cartellization of international news agencies, 
freedom to run the individual correspondent of the small news-
paper out of business."2o 
The international die in the post-war era was rapidly being cast. 
Despite these fundamental obstacles, the crusade was able to win 
approval for several draft conventions at the Geneva conference 
and eagerly awaited submitting the freedom of information pro-
posals to the General Assembly. Ultimately, the crusade efforts 
would bear fruit in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of H u-
man Rights (1948) which states: "Everyone has a right to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of fron-
tiers."2! However, the guarantee is limited by Article 29 which pro-
vides, "Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the 
free and full development of his personality is possible."22 
Despite general principles of freedom of expression in the 
Human Rights Declaration it would soon become apparent that 
emerging nations would have no part of the American model of 
freedom of expression. Eventually, Blanchard reports the crusade 
fell into disfavor at the United Nations and the crusaders aban-
doned the mission. Blanchard writes that pressure on journalists to 
19 [d. 
20 [d. 
21 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc Al810 
at 71 (1948). 
22 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 29(2). 
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demonstrate their loyalty during the post-war red scare was, in no 
small measure, part of the reason for ending the crusade: 
American journalists blamed the Soviet Union and its allies for 
the failure of the United States press's dream of winning the 
world to freedom of the press, American style. Coupled with 
this anger was the significant fear that communism could not 
be stopped peaceably-that soon the United States and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics would face each other in one awful 
struggle to determine the fate of the world. Thus, encumbered, 
all Americans faced the threat of internal communism. Most 
American journalists reacted to this communist threat as did 
their colleagues in other professions. The journalists were 
frightened and unwilling to grant the slightest freedom to com-
munists for fear that any opening would lead to the end of all 
freedoms for all Americans. 23 
In time, the shoe would be on another foot and by the 1980s 
the freedom of information agenda was in the hands of Third 
World nations seeking a "New World Information Order." An in-
tense debate conducted primarily in the United Nations has contin-
ued unabated for the last ten years and Blanchard astutely points 
out that few have learned the lessons of the post-war free press 
crusade. "Few people had discovered that freedom of the press was 
culturally based and that no nation could impose its press system 
on another nation, just as no nation could impose its system of 
religion or government on another nation."24 In other words, those 
who forget history may be doomed to repeat it. Blanchard has made 
her case with convincing darity. 
23 BLANCHARD at 380. 
24 [d. at 402. 
